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ON CALLING GOD 'MOTHER' 
William Harper 
Patricia Altenbernd Johnson argues that referring to God in female terms is 
desirable in that it would help overcome patriarchy, bring to our image of 
God positive qualities missing when God is referred to in male terms, and 
would be more inclusive. I find that Johnson's notion of patriarchy is such 
that overcoming it involves introducing pantheistic elements into Christian 
belief. Also, Johnson's arguments assume an objectionable stereotype of 
maleness. The argument from inclusiveness is not supported by observation. 
Concluding that Johnson's arguments fail, I suggest that Biblical example is 
sufficient permission for referring to God exclusively in male terms. 
In her article "Feminist Christian Philosophy?," Patricia Altenbernd Johnson 
argues in favor of referring to God in female terms, at least as mixed with 
male terms.! Johnson's advocacy of the use of female terms for God is based 
on assertions that certain advantages would result from the practice. One 
alleged advantage is that the use of female terms for God would emphasize 
positive traits that are de-emphasized by the use of male terms, thus allowing 
our awareness of God to be more positive and emotionally complete. In 
support of this claim Johnson presents at length the claims of Sara Ruddick 
that the notions of preservation, growth, and social acceptability are espe-
cially tied to maternal activity.2 Johnson then claims that each of these attrib-
utes is expressed, for example, by the term 'Mother-God.' The term 
'Mother-God' expresses the idea that God's power is not so much "total 
control" but a preserving love, "a hopeful and supportive presence to help us 
face and cope with our lives."3 'Mother-God' stands for "ways of thinking 
that help the mother and child grow and change." This specifically includes 
the practice of story-telling.4 'Mother-God' also supposedly calls to mind the 
training of children "to be the kind of person others can accept and whom 
the mothers themselves can actively appreciate.'" 
The main problem with this claim is that there is nothing especially mater-
nal about any of these practices. Consider the "preserving love" Johnson 
mentions. For millennia, fathers have protected their children while teaching 
them how to take care of themselves, warning them against dangers, and 
teaching them how to confront and deal with unavoidable dangers in appro-
priate ways. Johnson ignores this role completely. Instead, she makes these 
characteristics primarily maternal, and contrasts them against the supposedly 
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paternal notion of power as "total control." She argues similarly with regard 
to the notions of psychological growth and training in social acceptability, as 
though the paternal role had little to do with socialization or psychological 
growth. In tum, Johnson's paternal God is cold and impersonal, and relates 
to us through power and control, not love. Johnson's view of the paternal 
God seems to be based on a deficient and arid view of fatherhood. 
If Ruddick is, indeed, the origin of these views, we can trace Johnson's 
mistake. For Ruddick, 'mother' and 'Father' are not gender indexed terms.6 
In fact, Ruddick advocates that males become mothers, that all parents be 
mothers. 
Fathers, historically, are meant to provide material support for child care and 
to defend mothers and their children from external threat. They are supposed 
to represent the 'world-its language, culture, work, and rule-and to be the 
arbiters of the child's acceptability in the world they represent. ... The point 
about-or against-Fathers is that their authority is not earned by care and 
indeed undermines the maternal authority that is so earned .... Fatherhood is 
more a role determined by cultural demands than a kind of work determined 
by children's needs .... The point against Fatherhood is that it offers unreal-
istic hopes and burdens to women and men who take up the caring labor of 
maternity .... Male (or female) parents who have enjoyed or been burdened 
by the ideology of Fatherhood can and shOUld take up the work of mothering 
instead.7 
In contrast, motherhood is characterized by Ruddick as a rich, emotionally 
nuanced institution. In fact, it becomes clear in her text that motherhood 
includes providing for the material well-being of the child and raising the 
child to be adapted to a demanding world-actions appropriate to Fatherhood 
as Ruddick characterizes it. Now, any author has leeway to define terms as 
he or she wishes. If we accept Ruddick's characterizations of Fatherhood and 
motherhood as definitions of those roles, then of course we would want all 
parents to be mothers. We would hope no parent is so emotionally vacant as 
to limit himself or herself to a role as arid as the Fatherhood described by 
Ruddick. Ruddick goes on in her book to make many excellent and subtle 
points about parenting (she calls it 'mothering'). However, outside the con-
text of the book we should revert to using terms in their accustomed senses, 
and in the real world 'fatherhood' refers to the roles played by real fathers 
in all their rich diversity. It is true that fatherhood has traditionally involved 
a responsibility to be the primary bread-winner, but to define 'fatherhood' as 
being limited to this and a few other functions would be no better than to 
define 'motherhood' as being limited to changing diapers and cooking food. 
In this context Johnson also cites Sallie McFague's assertion that referring 
to God as 'Mother' "could facilitate the experience of god [sic] as intimate 
and caring."8 Of course, referring to God as 'Mother' could not enhance our 
experience of these qualities unless referring to God as 'Father' had somehow 
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failed to include these qualities. Such a view is simply a distorted caricature 
of the paternal role. There is no need to begin using female terms for God if 
the sole purpose of doing so is to import such positive notions as preserving 
love, growth, and socialization. All of these qualities are fully expressed in 
the term 'father.' To deny that is simply to resort to a narrow stereotype of 
male parenthood. If paternity were what Johnson thinks it is, we would have 
a reason in favor of supplementing it with maternal notions. But the problem 
is with Johnson's perception offatherhood, not with the genuine connotations 
of the word 'father.' 
Another benefit Johnson sees in the adoption of female terms for God is 
the assistance it would lend to the destruction of patriarchy. 'Patriarchy' can 
mean, 'domination by men,' and that seems to be Johnson's use of the term. 
Evidently, the use of female terms for God would advance a non-dualistic 
eco-holism-the view that the integrity of nature is the supreme ethical 
value-which would in tum involve the demise of patriarchy. Here Johnson 
cites Rosemary Ruether: "Ruether suggests that using the name 'Godless' 
would help us overcome the dualism of nature and spirit."9 Ruether's program 
for overcoming this dualism is to combine the transcendence of God with a 
full measure of immanence. This importation of the divine into nature should, 
she thinks, result in an elevated valuation of nature and the adoption of the 
belief that humans must subordinate their interests to nature. According to 
Ruether, we must see our possession of intelligence as laying upon us "the 
responsibility and necessity to convert our intelligence to the earth. "10 
Ruether implies in her work that nature is good and that human influence is 
typically detrimental. 
There is virtually no place on the planet where one can go to find "nature 
untouched by human hands." Even if humans have not been there before, 
their influence has been carried by wind, water, and soil, birds, insects, and 
animals who bear within their beings the poisoning effects of human rapine 
of the globe. Nature, in this sense, can be seen as "fallen," not that it is evil 
itself but in that it has been marred and distorted by human misdevelopment. II 
In the same vein, Johnson refers us to the work of Elizabeth Dodson Gray. 
Gray claims in her book Green Paradise Lost that humans are no more 
important than any other species. Speciesism is seen as one type of hierar-
chical thinking. In tum, hierarchical thinking is seen as characteristically 
male and as the source of many social ills. Gray says that a first step in 
correcting such a system would be to assign rights for natural objects. In the 
chapter "We Must Re-Myth Genesis" she implies that humans do not have 
any greater intrinsic value than any other aspect of nature whatever. 12 
McFague, too, holds views which are in line with this thinking. I will quote 
her at some length. 
ON CALLING GOD 'MOTHER' 
The feminist theologians who have given attention to the nonhuman world 
have been, for the most part, those involved in Goddess traditions and witch-
craft, for whom the body, the earth, and nature's cycles are of critical impor-
tance. Those of us within the Christian tradition have much to learn from 
these sources, but even these feminists have not, I believe, focused primarily 
on the intrinsic value of the nonhuman in a way sufficient to bring about the 
needed change of consciousness. . .. The principal insight of liberation the-
ologies-that redemption is not the rescue of certain individuals for eternal 
life in another world but the fulfillment of all humanity in the political and 
social realities of this world-must be further deprivatized to include the 
well-being of all life .... An ecological perspective recognizing human de-
pendence on its environment .. .is the dominant paradigm of our time and 
theology that is not done in conversation with this paradigm is not theology 
for our time.B 
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Of course, it is a truism that human life is dependent upon its environment, 
but McFague and the other authors cited are talking about something distinct 
from this. They claim that we have an ethical obligation to care for the 
environment for its own sake. McFague explicitly wants to replace the I-it 
relationship with an I-Thou relationship.14 
To make sense of such talk we must inspirit nature. Otherwise, nature would 
have to be seen as totally indifferent to change of any kind, and the notions 
of harming or destroying nature would make no sense. To an indifferent 
nature, volcanic eruptions, ice ages, and the collisions of continents are not 
destruction; they are business as usual. Terms like 'destruction' and 'harm' 
are relative to values and interests. Historically, cultivated land, land changed 
to better serve human needs, was regarded for that reason as improved land. ls 
Damaging the Earth meant altering it so that it was less useful to people. 
Inspiriting the Earth, on the other hand, gives the Earth interests. Making the 
Earth a part of God makes us accountable to the Earth for God's own sake. 
In the latter case, harm to the Earth is no longer understood relative to human 
interests but relative to God's interests. Presumably, God, immanent in the 
world, has as interests the stability, equilibrium, and species diversity of the 
eco-system,16 but different prophets might give us different agendas. 
In the Judeo-Christian tradition, God is not the Earth. The Earth is cursed 
(Gen. 3.17). Christian ethics does not encourage us to act naturally. Acting 
naturally is what separates us from God. Christianity demands that we act 
supra-naturally. God transcends the Earth, and we seek communion with God, 
not the Earth. Denying the reality of this bifurcation effectively denies origi-
nal sin and vitiates any need for a Christ. The immanence of God in the world 
would seem to be inconsistent with the Gospel message, and claims of God's 
immanence would thus be no proper motivation for anything, including re-
ferring to God as female. 
What is more important here, is that there is no essential or practical 
connection between monotheism and environmental disruption. The essential 
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transcendence of God is not a reason to lay waste to the planet. God said to 
subdue the Earth, not to make it uninhabitable. A conservationist attitude 
follows from an awareness that we have an obligation not to put people 
arbitrarily at risk and that the ecosystem cannot continue to support people 
if it is stressed without limit. There is no need to resort to pantheism for 
adequate motivation to protect the environment. 
Johnson's argument presupposes that maleness, patriarchy and dualism are 
linked in some essential or causal way, not only to each other but to a number 
of other disdained qualities and practices. This view is shared by the authors 
Johnson cites for support. Gray is the most advanced of these authors. Male 
hierarchical thinking is seen by Gray as the common denominator of sexism, 
classism, racism, speciesism, dualism, scientific reductionism, patriarchy, 
and inequality in general. 
Ruether, in turn, simply defines 'patriarchy' as hierarchy, explicitly includ-
ing in the notion of 'patriarchy' master-slave relationships and "racial over-
lords over colonized people."17 Modes of reasoning are seen as gender typed, 
as when she claims that the elimination of gender bias will require a "new 
form of human intelligence," since the present one is "white Western male" 
rationality. 18 
One problem with this conceptual approach is that, while decrying dualism 
and reductionism of one sort, it is in its own way reductionist and rigidly 
dualistic. We are offered a virtually undifferentiated complex-male/logical! 
hierarchical!rationalllinearlhuman-centered/oppressive/exploitive/capitalistic/ 
patriarchal!individualistic/imperialistic/dualistic. This complex is reduction-
ist in the sense that all these qualities reduce to maleness. It is rounded out 
by occasional references to whiteness, Westernness, and heterosexuality. It is 
balanced by a corresponding complex of allegedly female qualities so that 
we end up with a dualism whose complements are male/female, hierarchical! 
communal, capitalist/socialist, exploitive/non-exploitive, etc. All of the 
"male" traits are valued negatively, the "female" traits positively. Paradoxically, 
the complements include dualisticlholistic and reductionistlnon-reductionist, 
with dualism and reductionism supposedly being traits characteristic of male 
thinking. The evident logical deficiencies of this kind of conflation, and the 
one-sided valuations of its metaphysic, require no further comment. 
Suppose, though, that the gender-dualist picture of reality is correct. Then 
God Himself would surely be aware of this dichotomy, and we would have 
to begin asking in earnest why God revealed Himself exclusively in male 
terms, why Jesus deliberately called God 'Father' and not 'Mother.' If the 
authors quoted above are correct in the gender-dualistic view of society 
implicit in their arguments, then Christian women become radically estranged 
from God in a way no conservative theologian has ever dared allege. On the 
other hand, if we deny such gender dualism we leave open the possibility that 
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male references to God in the Bible signify nothing essentially non-female 
about God. 
I conclude that Johnson's argument is unconvincing. Johnson's advocacy 
of the use of female terms for God rests on a demeaning, false stereotype of 
maleness, a stereotype which does not deserve our support. Her argument 
also appeals to an alleged ecological imperative to radically revalue the 
Christian faith. The support for this imperative is lacking in that ecological 
destruction is not entailed by transcendental views of God, and the pantheism 
involved in the proposed revaluation is objectionable. As well, Johnson's 
argument rests upon a conflation of several concepts, including 'patriarchy' 
and 'spirit-matter dualism,' that have no obvious connection. A realistic view of 
maleness, together with a more careful, non-reductionist use of terms, would 
shatter the gender-dualist paradigm presupposed in Johnson's argument. 
Although Johnson fails to provide support for a societal imperative to refer 
to God using female terms, there might be other causal links between the use 
of female terms for God and improved social conditions. However, consider 
the Kogi of the Colombian Sierra Nevada. They refer to the Creator of the 
Universe exclusively in females terms, yet their society is a rigid patriarchy, 
the all-male priesthood dictating even the most minute aspects of Kogi life.19 
Consider also the social structures of ancient Egypt and other societies with 
strong goddess traditions. Historically, there seems to be no correlation what-
ever between the gender of a supreme Deity and social conditions. The case 
for a causal connection between the perceived gender of God and social 
conditions is tenuous at best. Therefore, it is not at all clear that a referentially 
hermaphroditic supreme Deity (Godless), or an alternately male and female 
supreme Deity, would be causally efficacious on social conditions.20 
Does there remain an adequate reason for breaking with tradition and Bib-
lical example, and for referring to God as female? Johnson implies in her 
paper that the exclusive use of male terms for God alienates women from the 
Church, making them "invisible." This is a serious matter. The Gospel is for 
everyone, and we should not engage in practices that suggest otherwise. But 
experience indicates that the alleged alienation is more a matter of interpre-
tation than a matter of reality. For example, in the United States, the fastest 
growing churches are mostly conservative, and most of their new membership 
is women. Women hold fewer positions of authority in the more conservative 
churches, but women are aware of that when they join, and they are joining 
conservative churches anyway and in numbers that significantly exceed 
men.21 This suggests that Johnson's allegation is a victory of theory over 
observation. Christianity is already inclusive. We are not all Semitic, or 
Jewish, or male, but all who accept Christ are children of Abraham, are God's 
chosen people-and sons, in the sense of full inheritors in the Kingdom of 
God. 
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It may be that certain individuals, for whatever reasons, feel alienated from 
God when they refer to God exclusively in male terms. If this is the case, 
and if referring to God in female terms facilitates their growth as Christians, 
then that would be a reason in favor of their so referring to God. This does 
not imply that those who refer to God in exclusively male terms are wrong 
to do so. Rather, it is a principle that admits of personal differences in how 
people best relate to their Creator. It states that individuals and individual 
churches should do what best facilitates their growth in the Faith, and that 
possibly no one practice will be best for all people. 
I have spoken with some people who seem to take the liberalism of the 
above paragraph as an affront to equality. The objection seems to be ideo-
logical, requiring that references to God should include female terms not 
because doing so is instrumentally good (Johnson's approach) but because 
using a single gender is intrinsically wrong. Even assuming that such a prin-
ciple holds at all, additional premises would be required to establish it as an 
overriding principle. In any case, it does not seem tenable for anyone sub-
scribing to the perfection of Christ. While we do not have a record of Jesus 
specifically denouncing every form of evil, he surely never took part in 
wrongdoing, and Jesus referred to God exclusively in male terms. It would 
seem, then, that there is nothing intrinsically wrong in doing so. 
As for God the Father, He is, as always, flowing with just those positive 
qualities that Johnson wants to say are gynocentric and in opposition to 
maleness. God, Abba, is loving, supportive, gracious, charitable, forgiving 
and encouraging, and He is patiently training us to be likewise.22 
University of Alabama 
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